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THE INTERACTION OF CUSTOMARY LAW AND
MICROFINANCE: WOMEN'S ENTRY INTO THE
WORLD ECONOMY
ABSTRACT
This note examines the complicated relationship between micro-
finance and customary law. Microfinance, the practice of giving small,
collateral-free loans to the poorest members of society, has gained
great popularity in the last thirty years. These loan programs specifi-
cally target women and use women's traditional emphasis on groups
to ensure success. Customary law can hinder microfinance ventures
because of the restrictions these laws place on women's roles and
responsibilities. Case studies on the Dominican Republic, Morocco,
and Bangladesh explore how individual customary laws can hinder
microfinance programs and women's micro-businesses. This note also
discusses how microfinance programs act as catalysts of social change,
affecting customary laws and women's status in their communities
and homes.
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INTRODUCTION: THE RISE OF MICROFINANCE
Gender disparities in developing countries continue despite
progress over the last half century.' No region in the world can
claim complete equality between men and women in terms of social,
economic, or legal rights.2 The International Covenant on Civil and
1. WORLD BANK, ENGENDERING DEVELOPMENT THROUGH GENDER EQUALITY IN
RIGHTS, RESOURCES, AND VOICE 3 (2001) [hereinafter ENGENDERING DEVELOPMENT].
2. Id. at 4. Economic rights are defined in this note as those rights listed in the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and an overall
ability to participate in the economic marketplace. Legal rights are those embodied in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
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Political Rights,3 which is ratified by 160 parties,4 includes the right
to freedom and liberty of movement,5 the right to privacy, 6 and the
right to freedom of thought, among others. The treaty guarantees the
right to equality before the law,8 yet women in Botswana, Namibia,
Lesotho, and Swaziland have no independent right to manage prop-
erty.9 In parts of sub-Saharan Africa, a husband has the right to
claim his wife's labor, but a wife cannot make the same claim to her
husband's labor.'° Across the globe, women account for less than 10%
of elected officials in national assemblies.11
The economic rights of women are even more limited than their
legal rights, especially in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. 2 The
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
guarantees the right to an education,13 yet in South Asia and sub-
Saharan Africa girls have consistently lower enrollment rates14 and
receive fewer years of schooling than boys.15 In sub-Saharan Africa,
62% of primary school-age boys attend classes compared to 58% of
girls. 6 The difference is greater in South Asia where 78% of boys
attend school but only 71% of girls attend. 7 Legal inequality and a
lack of education can lead to women's exclusion from economic life,
especially as the world economy grows more information-based and
less focused on traditional modes of production. 8 For example, women
in several African countries are less productive than men because they
3. International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
4. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/bodies/ratificationI4.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
5. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 3, at 12.
6. Id. at 17.
7. Id. at 18.
8. Id. at 14.
9. ENGENDERING DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 37.
10. Id.
11. WORLD BANK, GENDER EQUALITY & THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS 4
(2003), available at http://www.mdgender.nettupload/monographs/WB GenderEquality
_MDGs.pdf [hereinafter GENDER EQUALITY & THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS].
12. ENGENDERING DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 38.
13. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200
(XXI), 13, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
14. ENGENDERING DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 42 fig.1.2.
15. Id. at 42 fig.1.2.
16. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], The Millennium Development Goals Report
2006, at 7 (2006), available at http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/resources/static/products/
progress2006/MDGReport2006.pdf.
17. Id.
18. See ENGENDERING DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 44.
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cannot access the same "productive inputs and human capital." 19 The
World Bank estimates that if women in sub-Saharan Africa had equal
access to these resources the total agricultural outputs of Africa would
increase by an astonishing 6 to 20%.20 To compound the problem,
gender disparities in education and health are greatest among the
poorest members of society.21
Gender inequalities have a large effect on individual women's
lives and the lives of their families.22 The inequalities, however, take
an even greater toll on society as a whole.23 Gender disparity is
linked to higher rates of poverty and illness," as well as lower rates
of economic efficiency and progress.25 International institutions such
as the World Bank and the United Nations have not been blind to this
problem.26 In September 2006, the World Bank announced a new ini-
tiative devoting $24.5 million over four years to economically empower
women in developing countries. 27 The program is specifically dedicated
to improving women's competitiveness in the product, financial, land,
and labor markets.2" The United Nations addressed women's issues
in its Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), a set of economic and
human rights targets meant to be achieved during the first fifteen
years of this century.29 The MDGs include the goals of promoting
gender equality and empowering women, achieving universal primary
education, and improving maternal health care. °
These announcements aside, the most innovative and perhaps
most effective change for women has been the spread of microfinance
institutions.31 Microfinance is the practice of lending small sums of
money to the poor, who would not normally be served by the financial
19. GENDER EQUALITY & THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS, supra note 11, at 7.
20. Id.
21. ENGENDERING DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 6.
22. Id. at 8.
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. Id. at 10.
26. See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
27. Press Release, World Bank, Giving Women Economic Opportunity is Smart
Economics (Sept. 16, 2006).
28. WORLD BANK, GENDER EQUALITY AS SMART ECONOMICS: A WORLD BANK GROUP
GENDER ACTION PLAN 9 (2006), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INT
GENDER/Resources/GAPOct5.pdf.
29. Kofi A. Annan, Op-Ed., Trade and Aid in a Changed World, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19,
2002, at A23.
30. U.N. Millennium Development Goals, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ (last
visited Jan. 15, 2008) (referring to Millennium Development Goals 2, 3, and 5).
31. See Ole Danbolt Mjos, Chairman, Nor. Nobel Comm., Nobel Peace Prize 2006
Presentation Speech (Dec. 10, 2006), available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/
peaceflaureates/2006/presentation-speech.html.
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industry.32 These loans are usually given without a demand for
collateral,33 so they are accessible to the poorest members of society,
who do not own property that can be used as collateral such as houses
or cars.34 Microfinance institutions play a "complementary role" to
traditional banking services by lending to people who would usually
be considered too risky.35 Many institutions also provide broader
services such as insurance and savings plans because their clients
also have difficulties accessing these types of financial services.36
Muhammad Yunus, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006,
started the microfinance experiment thirty years ago.37 He opened
the Grameen Bank, which had the institutional goal of giving small
collateral-free loans to the residents of rural Bangladesh."8 The
program seeks to "extend banking facilities to poor men and women;
eliminate the exploitation of the poor by money lenders; create oppor-
tunities for self-employment ... ; [and] bring the disadvantaged,
mostly the women from the poorest households, within the fold of an
organizational format which they can understand and manage by
themselves." 39 Because of its outstanding success in poverty allevia-
tion, the Grameen Bank itself was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize
in 2006 along with Mr. Yunus.4 °
Microfinance has taken the field of development by storm.41 It
has spread beyond Bangladesh to all regions of the world;4 2 "more
than 70 million of the world's poorest families have access" to these
institutions.43 The Grameen Bank alone serves more than seven mil-
lion borrowers as of September 2007.44 The United Nations declared
2005 to be the "International Year of Microcredit" and explicitly
32. Michael S. Barr, Microfinance and Financial Development, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L.
271, 279 (2004).
33. Id. at 279.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Isobel Coleman, Defending Microfinance, 29 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 181, 182
(2005); see also Connie Bruck, Millions for Millions, NEW YORKER, Oct. 30, 2006, at 62, 73.
37. Press Release, Nor. Nobel Comm., The Nobel Peace Prize for 2006 (Oct. 13, 2006),
available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/peaceflaureates/2006/press.html.
38. Coleman, supra note 36, at 182.
39. A Short History of Grameen Bank, http://www.grameen-info.org/bank/hist.html
(last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
40. Press Release, The Nobel Peace Prize for 2006, supra note 37.
41. See Paul B. Brown, Helping the Poor Do Business, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2006, at
C5; Bruck, supra note 36, at 62, 64; Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., Do-Gooders with
Spreadsheets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2007, at A21.
42. See Brown, supra note 41.
43. Coleman, supra note 36, at 182.
44. Grameen Bank: Bank for the Poor, http://www.grameen-info.orglbanklindex.html
(last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
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linked microfinance to the achievement of the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals.45
Women make up 97% of Grameen Bank's customers46 and are
specifically targeted for microfinance programs for a number of rea-
sons. As discussed above, women have fewer legal rights and eco-
nomic resources than men,47 and thus women are more likely to have
limited access to credit and the labor market.41 In fact, banks in de-
veloping countries traditionally lent only to men, excluding women
entirely.49 Microfinance addresses this gender-specific need.' Second,
women have higher rates of loan repayment:"' the Grameen Bank
boasts a 98% repayment rate.52 In short, loaning to women makes
good economic sense. Third, gender creates a difference in the range
of social benefits accruing from the loan. Yunus himself has stated
that Grameen Bank developed the policy of lending to women, not only
because of their high repayment rates, but also because "families
benefitted more when the women controlled the [loan] money." 53 Loans
to women have a greater impact on household expenditures and the
education levels of female children. 5 4 Child survival increases twenty
times more and child nutrition improves by 4 to 8% more than with
loans to men.55
In several ways, microfinance confronts customary law. Cus-
tomary law is defined as "[l]aw consisting of customs that are accepted
as legal requirements or obligatory rules of conduct; practices and
beliefs that are so vital and intrinsic a part of a social and economic
system that they are treated as if they were laws."56
This Note explores the tensions between customary laws and
microfinance. Part I of this Note looks at how customary law may help
and hinder women's micro-businesses. Morocco and the Dominican
45. Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General, Message on the Launch of the Inter-
nationalYear ofMicrocredit, U.N. Doc. DEV/2492:OBV/492 (Nov. 18,2004); Press Release,
U.N. Dep't of Pub. Info. & Year of Microcredit Secretariat, U.N. Launches International
Year of Microcredit 2005, U.N. Doc. DEV/2493:GAIEF/3098 (Nov. 18, 2004).
46. Muhammad Yunus, Grameen Bank at a Glance (Oct. 2007), http://www.grameen-
info.org/bank/GBGlance.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2008) [hereinafter Grameen Bank at
a Glance].
47. GENDER, EQUALITY& THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOAis, supra note 11, at 4.
48. Coleman, supra note 36, at 185.
49. Bruck, supra note 36, at 62.
50. Id.; Coleman, supra note 36, at 185.
51. Coleman, supra note 36, at 185.
52. Grameen Bank at a Glance, supra note 46.
53. Bruck, supra note 36, at 62.
54. JENNEFER SEBSTAD & GREGORY CHEN, MGMT. SYS. INT'L, OVERVIEW OF STUDIES
ON THE IMPACT OF MICROENTERPRISE CREDIT 16 (1996).
55. See Coleman, supra note 36, at 185.
56. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 413 (8th ed. 2004).
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Republic are case studies that examine how the customary laws of
Shariah, in the case of Morocco, and machismo, in the case of the
Dominican Republic, interact with microfinance loans. Part II fo-
cuses on how customary law has adapted to the introduction of micro-
finance and women's new financial strength. This section focuses on
Bangladesh and how the Grameen Bank's social program has success-
fully changed customary laws over the past thirty years. It investigates
how microfinance leads to changes in custom and the traditional
power distribution in families and communities.
I. MICROFINANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF CUSTOMARY LAW
A. Morocco and Shariah Law
Customary law and traditional norms can hinder the goals of
microfinance. In Morocco, "women's micro businesses are less likely
to grow than those of Moroccan men." 57 It is important to note that
traditional gender roles in Islamic customary law, and not inequality
in the legal code, restrict these businesses.58 In 2004, King Mohammed
VI radically reformed the Mudawana or Code of Personal Status. 9
The Mudawana governs family law, such as marriage, child custody,
and inheritance."s The new Code declares that marriage is "under
the direction of [both] spouses,"6 recognizing the contributions of both
wives and husbands to the marriage.62 The new law codifies women's
equal personal and economic status.6 Thus, Morocco's formal legal
status is in line with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), of which Morocco is a
57. INEzMuRRAY& NADIRABARKALLIL, WOMEN'S WORLD BANKING, GENDER BASELINE
SURVEY: MOROCCO 1 (2005).
58. See id.
59. Laura A. Weingartner, Comment, Family Law & Reform in Morocco - The
Mudawana" Modernist Islam and Women's Rights in the Code of Personal Status, 82 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 687, 687 (2005).
60. Id. at 693.
61. CODE DU STATUT PERSONNEL, art. 4 (Morocco).
[L]e mariage est un pacte fondd sur le consentement mutual et une union
l6gale et durable, entre un homme et une femme. Il a pour fin la vie dans
la fid6lit, la puretd et la fondation d'une famille stable sous la direction
des deux 6poux conform6ment aux dispositions du pr6sent code. [Marriage
is a pact founded on mutual consent and is a legal and lasting union,
between a man and a woman. Its goal is a life of fidelity, purity, and the
foundation of a stable family under the direction of two spouses, conforming
with the clauses of this code.]
62. Weingartner, supra note 59, at 697.
63. Id. at 698.
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signatory.64 CEDAW states that women should have the same rights
and responsibilities during marriage65 and that women have the right
to a profession and an occupation.66
Nevertheless, traditional inequality within the marriage continues
because of the influence of Islamic law, also known as Shariah.6" For
example, Morocco made a reservation to CEDAW saying that it would
pursue the treaty provisions only when "[tihey do not conflict with
the provisions of the Islamic [S]hariah." 6 In other words, when the
application of Islamic law results in inequality, Morocco's legal system
continues to enforce that inequality. King Mohammed VI reformed the
Mudawana with "strict respect" 69 to Shariah law, and the new Code
is not meant to completely overrule Islamic precedent. ° It continues
to endorse polygamy 71 and unequal child custody decisions.
7 1
Another source of inequality is the actual application of the re-
formed Mudawana.73 Moroccan judges may be unwilling to apply the
new law as it is written.74 Islamists in Morocco held massive demon-
strations against the reform and the new law was not welcomed in all
of society. 75 Judges have the right to use Shariah law as a gap-filler
in cases where the Mudawana is silent on an issue. 76Moreover, the
illiteracy rate among rural women is 85%, 7 and the overall illiteracy
rate for women is 39.6%.7" Thus, many women cannot read the new
64. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women [CEDAW], Meeting of States Parties, N.Y., N.Y., June 23, 2006, Declarations,
Reservations, Objections and Notifications of Withdrawal of Reservations Relating to
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 22-
23, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/SP/2006/2 [hereinafter Declarations, Reservations, Objections
and Notifications of Withdrawal of Reservations Relating to CEDA W].
65. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
[CEDAW], G.A. Res. 34/180, 16(1)(c), U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., 107th plen. mtg., U.N.
Doc. A/Res/34/180 (Dec. 18, 1979).
66. Id. at 16(1)(g).
67. HUMANRIGHTSWATCH, COUNTRYSUMMARY: MOROCCO (2006), available at http://
hrw.org/wr2k6/pdf/morocco.pdf; Weingartner, supra note 59, at 693.
68. Declarations, Reservations, Objections and Notifications of Withdrawal of
Reservations Relating to CEDAW, supra note 64, at 22. Reservations allow nations to
limit or modify the treaty conditions. In this case, Morocco limited the Convention to
include only those provisions that comply with its religious heritage.
69. CODE DU STATUT PERSONNEL, Prdambule.
70. Weingartner, supra note 59, at 708.
71. CODE DU STATUT PERSONNEL, art. 40.
72. Weingartner, supra note 59, at 711.
73. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 67.
74. Weingartner, supra note 59, at 711.
75. Id. at 709-710.
76. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 67.
77. Weingartner, supra note 59, at 711.
78. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK: MOROCCO, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mo.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
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law or newspaper articles about the reforms. To make equality pos-
sible, the government must institute a public education campaign
to teach women about their new rights.79
The marital inequality that results from certain Islamic custom-
ary laws has a deleterious effect on women's micro-businesses. 0 In
traditional Muslim marriages the husband is considered the family's
financial provider.81 He owes the wife "maintenance," which includes
food, clothing and housing.8 2 In return, the wife must follow the prin-
ciple of ta'ah, or obedience. 3 Ta'ah is a wife's duty to not leave the
home without the permission of her husband.84 Single women must
ask permission of fathers or brothers.8 5 Although there are no statistics
on how many women ask for permission and are refused, one can
assume that some women are kept out of the labor market as a result.
Moreover, ta'ah dictates that a woman cannot be away from home for
more than one night at a time. 6 For some women, business trips of
any kind are out of the question because the women are not allowed
to sleep away from home. 7 The inability of the business owner to
travel can limit her access to suppliers and to customers.
The customary laws of marriage also limit the time a woman
can devote to a business. The formal law of the Mudawana states
that both parents must provide their children with rights such as
protection, healthcare, food, and education. 8 In practice, however,
men rarely take on household responsibilities because it is consid-
ered shameful and part of the wife's obligations towards marriage.89
Therefore, women must complete all of their household duties before
working.9 ° Family obligations are the absolute priority, and the level
of household cleanliness and cooking must not suffer as a result of
business interests.9 Responsibilities for cleaning and child-care mean
that women's businesses are more likely to be based in their homes.92
79. Id.
80. See generally MURRAY & BARKALLIL, supra note 57 (discussing challenges to
Moroccan female-run micro-businesses).
81. Id. at 5.
82. JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO IsLAMIc LAW 167 (1964).
83. MURRAY & BARKALLIL, supra note 57, at 5.
84. Azizah al-Hibri, Islam, Law and Custom: Redefining Muslim Women's Rights,
12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLY 1, 12 (1997).
85. MURRAY & BARKALLIL, supra note 57, at 9.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. CODE DU STATUT PERSONNEL, art. 54.
89. MURRAY & BARKALLIL, supra note 57, at 7.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 9.
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Women also tend to work limited hours in the afternoon and evening
and cannot dedicate the entire day to their micro-enterprises.13 Ulti-
mately, this situation will lead to smaller, less successful businesses
because women have less time to advertise, develop new products,
or even keep regular business hours.94
The traditional idea of ird, or honor, limits both the size and types
of enterprises. Ird refers to "the honor or moral purity of a group,
its prestige in the community, and its strength." 95 A woman's actions
can have a detrimental effect on the ird of her husband and extended
family.96 It is important that women's activities are deemed appro-
priate and do not hurt the honor of the family.97 As a result, women
crowd into two or three types of businesses associated with traditional
gender roles.98 In a survey of 108 microfinance recipients, 34% of the
women worked in embroidery or sewing, and another 30% traded
small goods. 9 When women do break this customary law, other
members of society subject them to "some form of social sanction such
as name calling and, in some cases, sexual harassment." 00 Honor
also re-enforces the practice of female segregation. 101 Women do not
interact with non-kin males0 2 and cannot sell their wares in mar-
kets. °3 Thus they must work from home. 10 4 Overall, these factors
lead to smaller businesses and very high rates of competition among
women's micro-enterprises.
10 5
Families consider women's income supplementary even if it is
the primary income of the household.0 6 Therefore, women tend to
spend money on the home and children instead of reinvesting in their
business.' 7 As mentioned above, this can lead to a better standard
of living for all family members.' 8 On the other hand, it is another
factor keeping women's businesses smaller than those of men.0 9
93. Id. at 7.
94. See id.
95. MOUNIRA M. CHARRAD, STATES AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS: THE MAKING OF
POSTCOLONIAL TUNISIA, ALGERIA, AND MOROCco 63 (2001).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 63-64.
98. MURRAY & BARKALLIL, supra note 57, at 10.
99. Id. at 10 tbl.2.
100. Id. at 10.
101. CHARRAD, supra note 95, at 64.
102. Id.
103. MURRAY & BARKALLIL, supra note 57, at 10.
104. See id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 11.
107. Id.
108. Coleman, supra note 36, at 185.
109. MURRAY & BARKALLIL, supra note 57, at 11.
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B. Machismo in the Dominican Republic
Women in the Dominican Republic face similar constraints on
their micro-enterprises." 0 Because the Dominican Republic is pre-
dominantly Catholic and not Muslim,'' customary Islamic law does
not influence marriage relationships. Instead the customary law of
"machismo" rules the inner workings of the family.112 As in Morocco,
formal Dominican law does not match the customary practices.
113
One example of the difference between formal and customary law
is the financial responsibility of husbands and wives." 4 The C6digo
Civil (Civil Code) states that spouses share the responsibility for food
and the education of the children." 5 In contrast, under customary law
men are the heads of the household and solely responsible to make
ends meet." 6 This financial responsibility extends only to food and
housing."7 Men traditionally use leftover income on recreation, such
as alcohol, designer clothing, cars, and other luxury items that denote
status in the community." 8 Women must pay for extra family ex-
penses, including clothing, school fees, medicine, and furniture."'
This financial arrangement has major effects on women's micro-
businesses. Under the C6digo Civil, women have the right to start
businesses and can sell or mortgage personal items in connection with
that business without the permission of their husbands. 2 0 Neverthe-
less, instead of women using their personal goods to support their
110. See generally INEZ MURRAY, WOMEN'S WORLD BANKING, WWB GENDER STUDY:
THE CAPACITY OF POOR WOMEN TO GROW THEIR BUSINESSES IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
(2006). Murray reports the findings of the study of Women's World Banking on "the
effects of gender-related household dynamics on the ability of poor women to grow their
businesses" in the Dominican Republic. Id. at 1.
111. CENT. INTELLIGENCEAGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/dr.html (last visited Jan. 15,
2008).
112. MURRAY, supra note 110, at 15.
113. Compare MURRAY, supra note 110, with C6DIGO CIVIL (Dom. Rep.).
114. Compare MURRAY, supra note 110, at 34, with C6DIGO CIVIL, art. 203.
115. C6DIGO CIVIL, art. 203. "Los esposos contraen por el solo hecho del matrimonio,
la obligaci6n com(in de alimentar y educar los hijos." [The spouses contract by the mere
fact of marriage the common obligation to feed and educate their children.]
116. MURRAY, supra note 110, at 15.
117. Id. at 19.
118. Id. at 15.
119. Id. at 19.
120. C6DIGO CIVIL, art. 220. "La mujer tiene el derecho de ejercer una profesi6n sin
el consentimiento de su marido; puede siempre, para las necesidades de esa profesi6n,
enajenar y obligar, sus bienes personales en plena propiedad, sin el consentimiento de su
marido." [The woman has the right to exercise a profession without the consent of her
husband; if necessary for the profession, she can always sell or mortgage her personal
goods, without the consent of her husband.]
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businesses, the money flows in the opposite direction.'21 Women
funnel money into their households to fulfill familial needs instead
of investing in their businesses.'22 Women's businesses stay small
and under-funded. '23 This is especially frustrating given the fact that
some of the husbands' incomes are used for recreational activity.'24
Another example of a mismatch between customary and formal
law is infidelity within the marriage.'25 The Dominican C6digo Civil
clearly states that spouses owe each other fidelity.'26 Machismo, on
the other hand, allows men to have children outside of the marriage.'27
Again, this customary law can limit the success of women's businesses.
First, men with multiple families have less time to assume parenting
roles.'28 Women undertake the lion's share of child-rearing and other
household responsibilities, such as cooking and cleaning.'29 Therefore,
women prefer working part-time jobs or jobs with flexible hours. 30
These time restraints limit the types of businesses women can pursue
and the size the business can attain.131 Second, men who are respon-
sible for multiple families must spread their financial resources across
all the families. 132 Consequently, each family is poorer. 3 3 This puts
a strain on women and means even less investment in their businesses
as women shift their finances towards household needs.' Finally,
infidelity can foster an atmosphere of distrust, which hampers devel-
opment of joint businesses and cooperation. 3 ' In fact, one important
indicator of the future success of a micro-enterprise is cooperation
within the family network.
136
Because of the constraints detailed above, women prefer busi-
nesses that are conveniently located in their homes or neighborhoods
so they can keep up with their household responsibilities. 137 If the busi-
ness is located within the home, space is restricted and household
121. MURRAY, supra note 110, at 34.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Compare MURRAY, supra note 110, at 15, with C6DIGO CIVIL, art. 212.
126. C)DIGO CIVIL, art. 212. "Los c6nyuges se deben mutuamente fidelidad, socorro
y asistencia." [The spouses owe each other fidelity, help, and assistance.]
127. MURRAY, supra note 110, at 15.
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duties can distract from business growth.' Businesses located in the
neighborhood may have less opportunity to gain clients with sizeable
disposable incomes because microfinance is geared towards the poor-
est populations.'39 Concentration in certain neighborhoods limits the
spaces available for businesses and can crowd the market.140 As in
Morocco, the types of women's businesses must be socially accept-
able.14 ' Food preparation, sewing, sales, domestic work, and beauty
salons are the most popular types of business.42 This means very
high competition between women's micro-enterprises and a limited
opportunity for growth.
143
In summary, customary law works in several ways to limit
women's micro-businesses.144 Microfinance institutions tend to focus
on the poorest neighborhoods and women often join in groups. 145 The
participating women then open similar businesses 146 that are located
either in their homes or within the neighborhood. 14 The competition
rate is high 4 ' so these businesses have a smaller chance of survival.
Women also cope with limited resources in both time and money
because of their household responsibilities. 149
C. Customary Law as a Catalyst for Success
Fortunately, customary law and traditional norms do not always
work against women's businesses: they may add to the success of
microfinance. 5 0 For example, women traditionally learn to value their
social groups, such as extended families or tribes,151 a trait which can
lead to successful loans and prosperous businesses.'52 Social capital,
which is the value of social networks, is defined as "shared norms or
138. Id.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 32-36.
140. MURRAY, supra note 110, at 43; Geoffrey K. TurnbuU & Jonathan Dombrow,
Spatial Competition and Shopping Externalities: Evidence from the Housing Market,
32 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 391, 391 (2006).
141. MURRAY, supra note 110, at 43.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 57-142.
145. Grameen Bank Credit Delivery System, http://www.grameen-info.org/banklcds
.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
146. MURRAY, supra note 110, at 43.
147. Id. at 45.
148. Id. at 43.
149. Id. at 42.
150. See infra text accompanying notes 151-208.
151. Susan Johnson, Gender Norms in Financial Markets: Evidence from Kenya, 32
WORLD DEV. 1355, 1370 (2004).
152. MURRAY, supra note 110, at 42.
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values that promote social cooperation.""' Social capital within a
group can be very positive; it teaches people "social virtues such as
honesty, reciprocity, and dependability that they can then apply to
relationships with other people."154 Social capital has many benefits,
including reducing the probability of being poor.'55 In fact, at low
income levels the financial returns on social capital investment are
greater than the returns on human capital investment. 5 ' In a micro-
finance context, this means participation in a loan group has a greater
economic effect than an equal amount of time spent on education or
training.'57 Social networking and relationships have a direct economic
pay-off. 5 ' This demonstrates the significance of social capital and
how it directly leads to economic opportunities.
Women are especially well-suited to exploit social capital because
of their traditional emphasis on social networks.'59 Groups "have been
and remain a means through which women learn about and fulfill
both their social and economic roles." 6 0 This means women can be-
come both financially and emotionally invested in their microfinance
groups. Moreover, women have less mobility than men and typically
have less chance for interaction outside of their family units."'6 There-
fore, the microfinance groups are one of the only available ways to
build social capital.'62
Microfinance institutions take advantage of the customary group
dynamic of women in a number of ways. First, institutions encourage
and create social capital to ensure repayment of the loans. 16 3 One of
the Grameen Bank's Decisions, or mottos, is "[w]e shall take part in
153. Francis Fukuyama, Social Capital and Development: The ComingAgenda, 22 SAIS
REv. 23,27 (2002). See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CMC
TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY 163-85 (1993) (discussing the role of social capital in ensur-
ing Italian institutional success); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE
AND REVIVAL OF THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000) (discussing the decline of organized
social groups in the United States and the implications for groups and individuals).
154. Fukuyama, supra note 153, at 30.
155. Christiaan Grootaert, Social Capital, Household Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia
63 (Environmentally & Socially Sustainable Dev. Network, World Bank, Working Paper
No. 6, 1999), available at http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/
wps2000series/wps2148/wps2148.pdf.
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all social activities collectively." 16 4 The Decisions are recited at every
group meeting,'65 and no one can become a member until she has
memorized all of them.166 The entire Grameen program aims to create
an environment of group solidarity. 17 For instance, borrowers initially
organize themselves into groups of five, with only two women eligible
for loans.' 8 The other members of the group become eligible for loans
after the first two women start to repay the principal and interest of
the initial loan.6 9 Undoubtedly, the first loan recipients will feel a
sense of loyalty to the group and some pressure from those group
members who must wait for their loans. 70 Furthermore, if any mem-
ber of the group defaults on her loan, the other members will be
barred from further borrowing. 17' The group members are invested
in each other's actions, and the group succeeds or fails as a whole. 172
The group pressure not to default can be described as a "shame
factor." 173 A study of the Fundation para el Desarrollo Integral de
Programas Socioeconomicos (FUNDAP),17' a microfinance institution
in Guatemala, found that group borrowing creates a moral obligation
to repay. 17 FUNDAP uses an approach similar to the one used by the
Grameen Bank, described above. 176 The study showed that the group
dynamic helped ensure loan repayment.'77 The group helped those
borrowers who encountered hardship to repay their loans and also
threatened and sanctioned debtors who were remiss. 7 ' The group
effectively shamed negligent members into better behavior. 179 In
Kenya, group members repossessed household goods of women who
did not repay.' 0 Kenyan women stated they would rather borrow
164. The 16 Decisions of Grameen Bank, http://www.grameen-info.org/bank/thel6.html
(last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
165. Coleman, supra note 36, at 185.
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We Stand?, in FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: EXPLAINING THE LINKS
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money from a friend than default on their loan. 8 ' The inability to
repay is shameful, embarrassing, and could "'spoil' the group."8 2
Women are more responsive to this kind of social pressure than
men.'83 Kenyan men reported a number of failed men's groups and
attributed the failure to a more individualistic culture.8 4 Men "did
not like the strictness of the rules involved in groups and the fines
they would incur if they did not attend" meetings. 185 They were also
wary of being viewed as dependent and, therefore, inferior. 186 Instead,
men preferred to solve their financial problems privately.8 7 Overall,
the social capital in men's groups is much lower, as demonstrated
by the lack of trust and cooperation.
Furthermore, a study in Zimbabwe showed that women were
more willing to sanction other members and that female sanctions
were more effective. 18 There is no definite explanation for why women
excel in these situations. Clearly, customary laws keep women focused
on domestic life, which is less individualistic and more group-oriented.
Perhaps the experience of child-rearing teaches women more effective
ways to discipline group members.
Microfinance institutions also use women's social capital as a
source of information.'89 One of the major problems with finance in
developing countries is the lack of available information about poten-
tial debtors. 90 Because banks are unable to differentiate between
high risk and low risk debtors, everyone suffers from higher interest
rates.'9 ' The group lending context solves this problem by using poten-
tial debtors' knowledge about their friends and neighbors.'92 As ex-
plained above, the Grameen Bank program gives individual loans to
women, but the women must approach the Bank as a group of five.'93
If any of the five women defaults on her loan, all five members will be
barred from further loans.'94 Therefore, women must pick their group
members carefully and will use the knowledge they have from prior
181. Id. at 1367.
182. Id.
183. See id. at 1370.
184. Id. at 1368.
185. Id.
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dealings to choose the most responsible partners."'9 This system also
reinforces the group interdependence of the women and encourages
them to become involved with monitoring each other's projects.'96 The
women debtors will try to ensure the other group members choose
less risky businesses so no defaults will occur. 197 Thus, the Grameen
Bank benefits by having a built-in check on risky projects.198
Women's social capital is beneficial not only to the sponsoring
microfinance institution, but also to the members themselves. For
example, these groups provide a client base for new businesses. 199
In Morocco, men and women are generally separated from each other
because of customary Islamic law.200 Outside of the home, women are
generally confined to the hammam (public bath house) and cere-
monies such as weddings and funerals for which they are primarily
responsible.0 1 Women can use this gendered space to make business
connections, and most rely on word-of-mouth advertising and recom-
mendations to expand their client base.20 2
In the Dominican Republic, social networks allow women to grow
their businesses.2 3 Although women are primarily responsible for
children and caring for the elderly, which can take time away from
micro-enterprises, female family members can help by assuming
some of the household responsibility.20 4 By babysitting, cooking and
cleaning, female family members, especially elderly mothers who
may live in the home, can give the entrepreneur more time to run
her business.2
5
Interestingly, women's customary roles may contribute to micro-
finance success. As explained above in the Moroccan and Dominican
examples, women are the ultimate managers of the household.2 6 Poor
women are accustomed to coping with scarce resources, and they
bring these skills to the management of their small loans.20 7 After
195. Id. at 138-9.
196. Id. at 139.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See MURRAY & BARKALLIL, supra note 57, at 11.
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noting this particular expertise, the Grameen Bank started to target
women for its program."'
Customary law works to both help and hinder microfinance for
women. Microfinance institutions should craft their programs to
take advantage of some aspects of customary law. They can also in-
corporate programs to try to overcome certain difficulties, such as
providing child-care so women will have more time to devote to their
businesses.2 °9
II. MICROFINANCE AS AN AGENT OF CHANGE IN WOMEN'S LIVES
Microfinance also acts to change customary law in society. Some
microfinance institutions even have explicit social programs that
extend far beyond prudent money management.210 For example,
during the meetings of Grameen Bank loan groups, borrowers recite
the "Sixteen Decisions." 21 Eight loan groups, totaling forty women,
meet weekly with a Grameen Bank representative.212 Loans are re-
paid and disbursed at these meetings,213 and the Decisions are recited
aloud.2"4 The Decisions are:
1. We shall follow and advance the four principles of Grameen
Bank - Discipline, Unity, Courage and Hard work - in all
walks of our lives.
2. Prosperity we shall bring to our families.
3. We shall not live in dilapidated houses. We shall repair our
houses and work towards constructing new houses at the earliest.
4. We shall grow vegetables all the year round. We shall eat plenty
of them and sell the surplus.
5. During the plantation seasons, we shall plant as many seedlings
as possible.
6. We shall plan to keep our families small. We shall minimize
our expenditures. We shall look after our health.
7. We shall educate our children and ensure that they can earn
to pay for their education.
8. We shall always keep our children and the environment clean.
9. We shall build and use pit-latrines.
10. We shall drink water from tubewells. If it is not available,
we shall boil water or use alum.
11. We shall not take any dowry at our sons' weddings, neither
shall we give any dowry at our daughters [sic] wedding. We shall
208. Id.
209. MURRAY, supra note 110, at 71.
210. See Grameen Bank Credit Delivery System, supra note 145.
211. Coleman, supra note 36, at 184-85.
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keep our centre free from the curse of dowry. We shall not practice
child marriage.
12. We shall not inflict any injustice on anyone, neither shall we
allow anyone to do so.
13. We shall collectively undertake bigger investments for higher
incomes.
14. We shall always be ready to help each other. If anyone is in
difficulty, we shall all help him or her.
15. If we come to know of any breach of discipline in any centre,
we shall all go there and help restore discipline.
16. We shall take part in all social activities collectively.215
These affirmations include business skills and a commitment to
fellow borrowers (Decisions 1, 2, 13, 14, and 15) but they go much
further. There is a real commitment to better health (Decisions 3,
4, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 10) and social change (Decisions 6, 7, 11, 12, and 16).
One example of how Grameen Bank is trying to change custom-
ary law is Decision 6, a commitment to having smaller families.
216
Bangladesh, which is slightly smaller than the state of Wisconsin,
217
contains over 150 million people.218 Population growth became a
problem when mortality rates drastically dropped between 1900 and
1960.219 As a result, the Bangladeshi population growth rate sky-
rocketed to 2.26% a year.220
There are a wealth of hypotheses explaining why the Bangladeshi
culture demands having a large family. First, children are an economic
asset because of their labor contributions to the household and their
potential as wage earners.221 Children can act as insurance against
catastrophic events that may happen to the family: children may start
to work and earn money if the sole wage-earner dies or is disabled.222
Second, religion could play a role because the use of contraception is
controversial in Islam, 223 and 85% of Bangladeshis are Muslim. 224
215. The 16 Decisions of Grameen Bank, supra note 164.
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217. Bimal Kanti Paul, Changes in Reproductive Behavior in Bangladesh, 87
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Whatever the underlying reasons, having a large family was
the rule, and it was one of the only ways for women to gain respect
and status in rural Bangladesh.22 5 A young woman moves into her
husband's home when she marries.226 Her mother-in-law supervises
all of her actions, and young brides have little say over household
decisions or expenditures.227 One of the main ways a wife can con-
tribute to the household is by giving birth to sons, who become wage
earners and support the parents later in life.228 Thus, by having
children and showing competence in her household duties, a woman
can gain social recognition and security.229
The introduction of microfinance in Bangladesh helped shatter
this customary law of large-scale families. First, microfinance removed
the need to have big families.23 ° A successful microfinance business
brings in household income so it is less important to have children
as a form of economic insurance.231 Women had a new avenue for gain-
ing respect and did not have to gain status only through fertility.232
Second, the Grameen Bank institutionalized the idea of smaller
families and women had to commit to this new custom before they
could gain access to loans.233 Women not only have to memorize the
Decision but they must repeat it at each weekly meeting.234 Although
there are no formal sanctions for women who have a large number of
children, there are probably informal social sanctions. Just as women
are ashamed to not repay their loans, there may be a "shame factor" 23 5
associated with breaking one of the Sixteen Decisions.
The link between microfinance and the birth rate is undeniable.
Studies show that contraceptive use is eleven percentage points higher
in villages reached by Grameen Bank than in similar villages without
the program.2 36 Grameen Bank currently reaches 89% of poor families
225. See Akiko Nosaka & Bradford W. Andrews, Institutionalized Powerlessness in
Context: The Static and Dynamic Nature of Women's Status in Rural Bangladesh, 6 J.
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in Bangladesh,2 3' and the Bangladeshi birth rate is an average of just
over three children per woman.23 Before the Grameen Bank started,
the birth rate was twice as high. By rejecting the customary law and
empowering women, Grameen Bank created real cultural change.
Another example of an evolution in customary law is the
Bangladeshi dowry system and child marriage. Changes in formal
laws have not brought equal changes in the customary dowry sys-
tem.2 39 The Dowry Prohibition Act of 1980, as amended in 1986,
prohibits all forms of dowry and makes dowries punishable by up
to five years in prison.24° Nevertheless, the dowry system remains
prevalent among the rural poor.241
Dowries perpetuate a cycle of poverty because each family forced
to pay a dowry for a daughter will demand an equivalent or higher
dowry upon the marriage of a son.242 Families try to recuperate the
money spent on daughters by passing the cost along to the next
family.24 3 Often brides do not bring the promised dowry, which re-
sults in violence against the bride and hundreds of deaths per year.244
The Grameen Bank developed Decision 11 in response to members'
concerns.24 Decision 11 states "[w] e shall not take any dowry at our
sons' weddings, neither shall we give any dowry at our daughters [sic]
wedding. We shall keep our centre free from the curse of dowry. We
shall not practice child marriage.""' If families with sons refuse to
take dowries, then the pressure of paying a dowry for the daughters
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is alleviated.24 7 This cultural support could prove much more effec-
tive than the legal prohibition. Popular opinion is against the dowry
system.248 Microfinance participants have a better ability to refuse
participation. These mothers can point to the Sixteen Decisions as
a reason for not providing a dowry for their daughters.249 They also
have the group support of their fellow borrowers, which can bolster
their resolve.25 °
Decision 11 also prohibits child marriage.2 5' This is an especially
important issue for women because child marriage affects more girls
than boys.252 The Bangladeshi law blatantly discriminates between
boys and girls.2 53 The Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929 allows
males to make a valid marriage contract starting at age twenty-one,
but females can marry three years earlier, at age eighteen.254 If one
marries below the appropriate ages, the marriage is not automatically
void but merely can be voided when that spouse reaches the age of
majority.2 55 Even these weak legal restrictions are not followed and
South Asia, including Bangladesh, has the highest rate of child mar-
riage in the world.256 About 58% of Bangladeshi girls marry between
the ages of sixteen and eighteen despite the law.2 57
Child marriage can have a devastating effect on a female's life.
A child bride is more vulnerable to health problems as a result of early
sexual intercourse and pregnancy.2 51 She is less likely to be educated
or employed and her children are also less likely to obtain higher
levels of education.2 59 Her financial prospects are poor, and "[tlhe
majority of affected girls become condemned to a life of financial and
social insecurity."260 In short, child marriage promotes the cycle of
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poverty and dependence that microfinance tries to stop. It seems
natural that a microfinance institution devoted to helping the poor
overcome poverty would target a customary law that not only limits
the economic prospects of one generation, but has drastic effects on
the second and third generations as well.
The combination of social pressure and economic growth could
help stem child marriage. Parents who delay marriage for their
daughters often based their decision on her employment.26 Contin-
ued education can also justify a girl's single status.262 Grameen Bank
addresses both of those concerns. First, girls can be employed in their
mothers' microfinance businesses.26 Second, members commit to
sending their children to school.264
Decision 7, where members commit to educating their chil-
dren, 265 is also a challenge to customary law. Fifty-seven percent of
the Bangladeshi population is illiterate266 and women's education is
especially underdeveloped.267 Girls receive a lower quality education
than boys do, and their schools are overcrowded.268 One explanation
for why there is cultural reluctance to educating girls is because brides
join their husbands' families upon marriage.269 Families do not want
to spend resources educating daughters when all of the benefits of that
education will transfer to another family.27° Therefore, Decision 7 is
notable in its commitment to education for both genders.271
In 1991, only 20% of Bangladeshi females could read, making
the literacy rate one of the lowest in the world.2 72 Today, over 50%
of Bangladeshi girls are enrolled in school.27 Bangladesh is one of
three South Asian countries that have reached gender parity in
its primary schools. 4 In fact, a U.N. report credits the Bangladesh
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Rural Advancement Committee, a microfinance non-governmental
organization, for the reversal of the educational gender gap. 275 The
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee emphasized girls' edu-
cation and educating children from even the poorest families.276
Grameen Bank's figures are also astounding. The institution
claims that 100% of its members' children are in school.277 This in-
cludes seven million families. There are also over twelve thousand
students in graduate schools. 279 The demand for education was so
large that Grameen Bank started a student loan program.2 0 The pro-
gram gives loans that cover all of the costs of education and repay-
ment only begins after the student begins her professional life.28'
This emphasis on education, including female education, has
dramatic effects on society. Educated women are more likely to use
reliable birth control methods and seek medical care.28 2 This leads
to lower mortality rates among mothers and children and stems
the spread of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases.283 Educated
mothers are more likely to send their own children to school, which
creates a virtuous cycle of education and opportunity.2 4 In short,
the education of daughters spreads the benefits of the microfinance
institution into the next generation.
CONCLUSION
This note has examined the complicated relationship between
microfinance institutions and customary law. Perhaps the most valu-
able contribution of microfinance is that it not only changes society's
norms but it also changes the women themselves. Microfinance serves
to empower women and change their status as second class citizens.28 5
The case studies of Bangladesh, Morocco, and the Dominican Republic
demonstrate how custom, religion, and poverty can keep women from
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Microcredit, Information Technology, and Poverty, supra note 207, at 237.
278. Speech at the Council on Foreign Relations: Ending Global Poverty, supra note 232.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Microcredit, Information Technology, and Poverty, supra note 207, at 237.
282. Girls' Education: A World Bank Priority, http://www.worldbank.org (search for
"girls' education"; then follow "Education - Girls' Education" hyperlink) (last visited
Jan. 15, 2008).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Speech at the Council on Foreign Relations: Ending Global Poverty, supra note 232.
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full participation in society.286 Microfinance, on the other hand, pro-
motes participation.287 It is a "process of human transformation." 28
Women transform from being submissive and secluded 28 9 to being inde-
pendent and publicly active. 29 For example, Grameen Bank borrowers
must vote in elections, thrusting women into the political sphere.291
In 1996, for the first time in Bangladeshi history, more women than
men voted in the national election.292 In 1997, over 2000 Grameen
borrowers ran as candidates and were elected to local office.293 Micro-
finance "has helped tremendously in changing the whole status of
women in Bangladesh."294
Women also gain status within their homes. In the Dominican
Republic, the traditional law of machismo rules that whoever earns
the money can decide how to spend it. 295 For the first time in their
lives, women are making monetary contributions and are gaining a
voice in household expenditures.2 96 Women are further breaking down
gender norms by insisting their sons do housework.2 97 Unlike their
fathers, this generation of boys will not consider housework as an
exclusively female activity.
Although a series of studies link microfinance with increased
domestic violence,298 microfinance ultimately protects women in
their homes.299 Women who participate in microfinance programs
gain autonomy and redefine their roles.300 This can bring them into
conflict with men who are uncomfortable with the changes.301 Never-
theless, domestic violence drops when women provide a high level
of income. 3 02 Microfinance "reduce [s] women's vulnerability to men's
286. See supra Part II.
287. Microcredit, Information Technology, and Poverty, supra note 207, at 236.
288. Id.
289. Nosaka & Andrews, supra note 225, at 162-63.
290. Microcredit, Information Technology, and Poverty, supra note 207, at 236.
291. Id. at 237.
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294. Speech at the Council on Foreign Relations: Ending Global Poverty, supra note 232.
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296. Id. at 54.
297. Id. at 57.
298. See Rosamund Ebdon, NGO Expansion and the Fight to Reach the Poor: Gender
Implications of NGO Scaling-up in Bangladesh, 26 IDS BULL. 49, 55 (1995); Sidney Ruth
Schuler et al., Credit Programs, Patriarchy and Men's Violence Against Women in Rural
Bangladesh, 43 SOC. ScI. & MED. 1729, 1738-39 (1996).
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violence [overall] by strengthening their economic roles and making
their lives more public."303
Most importantly, women gain status in their own minds. In
the Dominican Republic, women who started their own businesses
felt "more creative, intelligent, innovative, proactive, inclined toward
planning, and better organized." 304 They gain self-confidence and, with
that, an increased ability to make decisions and mold their own lives.
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